The Constitutionality of a Certain 48-year-old Voting Act: A Blog Post.

                Today’s post deals with the Supreme Court case Shelby County v. Holder, which was argued and decided in 2013. This case deals with the Constitutionality of sections 4b and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

                The above-mentioned Act “was enacted to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting.” Section 4b deals with particular districts that employed either tests or other prerequisites for voting as well as “low voter registration or turnout;” these districts were known as covered jurisdictions (1). Section 5 stated that these voting requirements could not be changed “until approved by specific federal authorities in Washington, D. C.” (2). This regulation was expected to last only five years but kept getting reauthorized. Finally, it was authorized for an additional 25 years in 2006.  

                The Tenth Amendment states that the powers not given to the Federal government or forbidden to be given to the states belong to the states or to the people. The Supreme Court admits that the liberties taken by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are in disagreement with the Tenth Amendment. However, an earlier Case said regarding the Act that “such an ‘uncommon exercise of congressional power’ could be justified by ‘exceptional conditions’” (3). The Court in Shelby County v. Holder decided that the conditions which necessitated these clauses of the Act have long since lost their place in America, and thus these clauses were no longer needed. Additionally, because the clauses concerned only nine states and some counties, they were against “the tradition of equal sovereignty” (4). Thus, Section 4 was deemed unconstitutional.

                I feel like it is good to know that the Supreme Court keeps tabs on laws and regulations that have outlived their usefulness. However, it feels strange to me that a law that at one time is necessary and right is deemed unconstitutional years later. It feels like if a law needs to be repealed, that is fine, but it should not be in danger of being unconstitutional in any case. I suppose, though, that this can fall under “necessary and proper” in order to carry out other parts of the Constitution (5), such as the 15^th Amendment, which states no one may be denied the right to vote based on race (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 15). This can also be compared to the suspension of Habeas corpus during the Civil War. After the Civil War, the right to Habeas corpus was reestablished. Thus it is with other laws, such as the Voting Rights Act, that violate the Constitution at face value. They are alright when deemed necessary, but when they are no longer applicable, steps should be taken to ensure their removal. 

Bibliography:

1. "Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General: Syllabus," Syllabus written by the Reporter of Decisions, hosted by Cornell University Law School. Website not dated, accessed March 20, 2014, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/12-96.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co.

 In 1979, workers of the Long Island Rail Road did not reach a collective bargaining agreement with the railroad. The State of New York, which owned the Long Island Rail Road was going to object to the strike planned by its workers, arguing that the Railway Labor Act, which gave the workers the right to a strike, applied not to the railroad because it was state-owned (and thus covered by the New York Taylor Law, which prohibited strikes, rather than the Railway Labor Act). The union of the railroad's workers sued in federal District court and commenced a strike the next day. The President of the U.S. intervened and ordered a 60-day cooling off period during which “the State converted the Railroad from a private stock corporation to a public benefit corporation” to try to run around the Railway Labor Act. The railroad then filed a state suit, “seeking to enjoin the impending strike under the Taylor Law,” but then the District Court decided the Railway Labor Act did apply to the Long Island Rail Road (1). However, the Court of Appeals reversed this ruling.

According to the District Court, the precedent set in National League of Cities v. Usery outlined that the “operation of a railroad in interstate commerce is not an integral part of governmental activity” (2). The Supreme Court noted that the Railroad really was held “to the terms of the Railway Labor Act,” but since it was a state railroad, the issue was whether the terms of that Act hindered the State from carrying out its functions (3).

Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that cases involving the doctrine in National League of Cities have three tests, and the one that this United Transportation Union is concerned with is “whether... the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions'” (4). In short, the Court decided that a railroad dealing with interstate commerce was “not an integral part of traditional state activities” safe from federal regulation (5). Chief Justice Warren went on to explain that, besides, railroads had been under federal regulation for over 100 years before, and New York knew the Long Island Rail Road was under regulation for 13 years before doing anything about it. The Supreme Court thus reversed the ruling of the Appeals court and decided the railroad was to be held under the Railway Labor Act.

In my opinion, the decision in this case was in line with other cases decided by the Court, such that the Federal government reserved the right to regulate Interstate trade. This is based on the Commerce Clause found in the Constitution, as discussed in class (U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8). Thus, because this right is given to Congress in the Constitution, the State laws concerning the same matter are not necessarily protected by the Tenth Amendment. It is clear that New York was putting up a fuss about the federal rights regarding this railroad solely to use state laws to its advantage in trying to stop the strike from happening.

However, what surprised me the most about this case was not the case itself but what happened before the case. Specifically, that the President had the right to intervene and order a longer cooling-off period in order to avoid a strike, although in the end it did not really work. I feel like that was overstepping the powers given to him, otherwise I do not know the whole story or have just overlooked a Constitutional power given to the President.

Bibliography:

1.“United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co.,” Supreme Court case syllabus and opinion by Chief Justice Burger, hosted by Cornell University Law School. Website not dated, accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/455/678

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.