The Video.

Here is the video I have made summarizing some of my research on the 10th Amendment. I have learned a lot this semester and as long as you don't know less about the Amendment now than you did at the beginning of the year, I'll be happy.

Take care, everyone.

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: A Case Brief

Parties: Joe G. Garcia and other San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority v. The San Antonio Metro politan Transit Authority.

Facts: The SAMTA employees wanted overtime pay they believed they were owed, so they sued.

Law: The Fair Labor Standards Act, which forced employees to give their employees overtime pay. Also involved is the previous Supreme Court case National League of Cities v. Usery, which argued that regulating "activities of state and local governments 'in areas of traditional governmental functions' would violate the Tenth Amendment" (1).

Procedural History: In the District Court, the Court gave SAMTA the win, arguing that transportation is an essential state function and therefore not subject to federal intervention according to the ruling in National League of Cities. The case was remanded but the Court again sided with SAMTA. The case eventually made it to the Supreme Court.

Findings: The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 majority, ruled the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to regulate a government-run mass transit authority with the Fair Labor Standards Act. Thus, the District Court ruling was reversed. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion claimed "that the courts had not come up with an analytically sound distinction between traditional and non-traditional government operations" (2). Since the ruling in National League of Cities said that regulations concerning state and local government activities "in areas of traditional government functions" were in violation of the Tenth Amendment, the ruling in Garcia essentially overturned this prior ruling (3). The majority believed state sovereignty was maintained in the Senate and the Electoral College. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens voted for the majority opinion, while Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor dissented.

Analysis: While I cannot really argue against the ruling in this case, I can write about my opinion on what the ruling did. The ruling seems like a great hindrance to state sovereignty in the name of commerce. Although I do agree that the transit workers should have received overtime pay, the way the Court went about granting it is altogether troubling for the states. I feel like the majority argument that state sovereignty is represented in the Senate and Electoral College is an abuse of power and a kick int he face to the Tenth Amendment.

Bibliography:
1. "Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. 30 Jan 2014. Web. 24 Apr 2014. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garcia_v._San_Antonio_Metropolitan_Transit_Authority. Quoting from National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833.
2. "Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. 30 Jan 2014. Web. 24 Apr 2014. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garcia_v._San_Antonio_Metropolitan_Transit_Authority.
3. "Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. 30 Jan 2014. Web. 24 Apr 2014. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garcia_v._San_Antonio_Metropolitan_Transit_Authority. Quoting from National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833.

Here is an article review. Enjoy.

                This week’s blog post is a review of an article published in Publius magazine in 1986. The article is “State Sovereignty in the Federal System: Constitutional Protections under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments” by James R. Alexander.

                The article begins with discussing the various ways the Tenth Amendment can be interpreted regarding state sovereignty and Congressional preemption of it. Next, the article mentions the Eleventh Amendment and the degree to which states are immune in the courts. The article then goes on to describe when Congress can preempt state sovereignty. The second half of the article consists of a series of reviews of various Supreme Court cases which have, over time, affected the sovereignty of States. The cases involved are: Parker v. Brown and National League of Cities v. Usery. Concluding the article is a summary of how state sovereignty has been affected by the decisions of these various cases.

                Overall, I felt that the article was well-written. I did not spot any typos nor any grammatical errors. Additionally, I found it relatively understandable; when there were some sentences which I understood not, it could likely be blamed on my relative inexperience with law. I appreciated the layout of the article better looking it over after having read it.

                Various points the article made are helpful to me in my research of the Tenth Amendment. For instance, I appreciated the explanations the article made concerning the Supreme Court cases towards the end. Court cases are difficult to understand, for me anyway, upon reading just the case briefs and summaries, so any scholarly explanations, including how the cases affect the interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, are welcome.

                I also found interesting the amount of complications the article seems to imply there are concerning when Congress can or cannot preempt state sovereignty. I had thought that the Tenth Amendment was pretty straightforward when describing which powers states could have. Thus, when it appeared to me that Congress was doing things that appeared to be interfering with state rights, it was automatically the fault of the federal government. However, due to the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper clause, the Federal government can do things lawfully that seem to be unconstitutional at face value.

                In conclusion, the article herein reviewed is a great read for those seriously interested in State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendment.

Bibliography:

James R. Alexander, "State Sovereignty in the Federal System: Constitutional Protections under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments," Publius 16 (1986): 1-15.

A Possible Case about Betting on Sports

This week’s post is about a Court Case that is waiting to possibly be granted certiorari by the Supreme Court. Said court case is New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.

In summary, the case is about the Constitutionality of a Federal regulation that essentially outlawed betting on sporting events in 46 states. This regulation is the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992. According to the plaintiffs, the Act says that it is “unlawful for a ‘governmental entity to *** license, or authorize by law or compact’ sports wagering activities” (1). Additionally, people are not allowed “‘to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote’ sports wagering activities if and only if done ‘pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity’” (2). Through this, the plaintiffs believe that the Act goes beyond what Congress is allowed to do in the Constitution, as well as violating the Tenth Amendment and principles of Federalism. Also, the plaintiffs claim that the since the law affects only 46 of the states, it “violate[s] the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” (3).

Before I state my opinion, I must say that I wonder why, according to the appeal to certiorari quoted above, it is illegal for a person to deal with “sports wagering activities” if they are done “pursuant to the law… of a governmental entity” (4). “Pursuant to” means “in conformance to” or “according to” (5). Why is something illegal if done according to the law? Perhaps that was a typo.

Anyway, I believe that what the Act regulates and how it does it is not of itself contrary to neither the Tenth Amendment nor the Congressional Powers in the Constitution. The Tenth Amendment states that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Article 1, Section 8 says that “The Congress shall have Power… To regulate Commerce… among the several States.” Additionally, the same Section gives Congress the Power “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.” This is commonly referred to as the Necessary and proper clause.

Using these clauses from the Constitution, it can be seen that what the Act regulates is within the bounds of the Constitution. Betting on sporting events can occur between individuals of multiple states, meaning it can be regarded as Interstate Commerce, which Congress has been given explicit power to regulate. Since the Necessary and Proper clause also gives Congress the power to do anything (essentially) to fulfill the Interstate Commerce clause, Congress can pass an Act that makes betting on sporting events illegal. Thus, since Congress has the Constitutional right to pass the said Act, the Tenth Amendment really does not come into play in this case.

The situation regarding the Equal Sovereignty part of the plaintiffs’ argument is less clear. According to a post on the Constitutional Law Prof Blog, Equal Sovereignty is not an actual Constitutional idea, but one that was formed in the 2009 case Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder. However, some of the Justices who agreed with the ruling in that case later dissented in a different case, stating that “there is no general doctrine of equal state sovereignty” (6). If the Horsemen’s Association case is granted certiorari, the decision should help to clear some of the muck. 

Bibliography:
1. Riccio, Ronald J., Berman, Eliott, et c. "New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen's Association, Inc., Petitioner, v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, National Basketball Association, National Football League, National Hockey League, Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, doing business as Major League Baseball, United States of America, Respondents," Petition for Writ of Certiorari. February 12, 2014, Online Document. Accessed April 10, 2014 from http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/13-979-NJTHA-Petition-for-Writ-of-Certiorari.pdf, page 5.
2. Ibid., 5,6. Partial internal quote from 28 U.S.C. 3702.
3. Ibid., i.
4. Ibid., 6. Quote from 28 U.S.C. 3702.
5. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, s. v. "pursuant to."
6. SDS, "How Did We Get the Principle of Equal State Sovereignty (in the Shelby County Case)?" Constitutional Law Prof Blog (blog), June 28, 2013, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2013/06/how-did-we-get-the-principle-of-equal-state-sovereignty-in-the-shelby-county-case.html

National League of Cities

                During the course of my research of the Tenth Amendment, one of the Supreme Court cases that I continuously encountered was National League of Cities v. Usery, so I decided to finally read up on that specific case.

                This case involves the Fair Labor Standards Act, which ruled that certain employers who fell within the bounds of the Act had to provide their employees with a minimum wage along with a 1.5x overtime pay for more than 40 hours worked per week. This seems common today, but when the case was decided, it was not. Eventually, the set of employers covered by the Act grew to include State and City employees. Thus, the National League of Cities got tired of this and sued in a District Court. The District Court ruled in favor of the defendant, but essentially stated that the Supreme Court would likely be interested in the case.

                It turns out they were.

                The Supreme Court did decide to hear the case. It ruled in favor of the National League of Cities. Essentially, the Court decided that even though Congress has the power to regulate commerce, even intrastate commerce if it affects interstate commerce enough, expanding which employers are covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act constituted a breach of the sovereignty of the States. The Law also hindered the States; examples were given of the Act costing employers thousands of dollars as well as having to decrease the number of hours of training programs (1).

                While I feel like it is a good thing that State sovereignty was upheld by this decision, I must say that I wonder why it was such a costly burden on the States to have to abide by the Act. If this is due to the minimum wage requirement, it seems like the states and/or cities were not paying their employees very much. However, other sources have suggested that restructuring to abide by the Act was also costly, so it might not have been only the minimum wage causing the problem (2).

                I kind of find it difficult to feel positively about this case when it essentially cuts down minimum wage for state/city employees. Perhaps what was under review was whether Congress could set a minimum wage for state employees across the nation, and the decision was that the minimum wage should be set by each individual state. However, the decision in this case was overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority a mere nine years later; this case state that employers, including state and local governments, should have a minimum wage (3). Therefore, I do not believe I misunderstood the premise of the National League of Cities case.

Webpages used:

1. "National League of Cities v. Usery - 426 U.S. 833 (1976)," Case syllabus and holding, with opinion by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, hosted by justia.com. Website not dated, accessed March 3, 2014, http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/426/833/case.html

2. "National League of Cities v. Usery," Wikipedia. Website last modified January 30, 2014, accessed March 3, 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_League_of_Cities_v._Usery. Referred to by Brett Kissane. 

3. "Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority," Wikipedia. Website last modified January 30, 2014, accessed March 3, 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garcia_v._San_Antonio_Metropolitan_Transit_Authority

                

The Constitutionality of a Certain 48-year-old Voting Act: A Blog Post.

                Today’s post deals with the Supreme Court case Shelby County v. Holder, which was argued and decided in 2013. This case deals with the Constitutionality of sections 4b and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

                The above-mentioned Act “was enacted to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting.” Section 4b deals with particular districts that employed either tests or other prerequisites for voting as well as “low voter registration or turnout;” these districts were known as covered jurisdictions (1). Section 5 stated that these voting requirements could not be changed “until approved by specific federal authorities in Washington, D. C.” (2). This regulation was expected to last only five years but kept getting reauthorized. Finally, it was authorized for an additional 25 years in 2006.  

                The Tenth Amendment states that the powers not given to the Federal government or forbidden to be given to the states belong to the states or to the people. The Supreme Court admits that the liberties taken by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are in disagreement with the Tenth Amendment. However, an earlier Case said regarding the Act that “such an ‘uncommon exercise of congressional power’ could be justified by ‘exceptional conditions’” (3). The Court in Shelby County v. Holder decided that the conditions which necessitated these clauses of the Act have long since lost their place in America, and thus these clauses were no longer needed. Additionally, because the clauses concerned only nine states and some counties, they were against “the tradition of equal sovereignty” (4). Thus, Section 4 was deemed unconstitutional.

                I feel like it is good to know that the Supreme Court keeps tabs on laws and regulations that have outlived their usefulness. However, it feels strange to me that a law that at one time is necessary and right is deemed unconstitutional years later. It feels like if a law needs to be repealed, that is fine, but it should not be in danger of being unconstitutional in any case. I suppose, though, that this can fall under “necessary and proper” in order to carry out other parts of the Constitution (5), such as the 15^th Amendment, which states no one may be denied the right to vote based on race (U.S. Constitution, Amendment 15). This can also be compared to the suspension of Habeas corpus during the Civil War. After the Civil War, the right to Habeas corpus was reestablished. Thus it is with other laws, such as the Voting Rights Act, that violate the Constitution at face value. They are alright when deemed necessary, but when they are no longer applicable, steps should be taken to ensure their removal. 

Bibliography:

1. "Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, Attorney General: Syllabus," Syllabus written by the Reporter of Decisions, hosted by Cornell University Law School. Website not dated, accessed March 20, 2014, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/12-96.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co.

 In 1979, workers of the Long Island Rail Road did not reach a collective bargaining agreement with the railroad. The State of New York, which owned the Long Island Rail Road was going to object to the strike planned by its workers, arguing that the Railway Labor Act, which gave the workers the right to a strike, applied not to the railroad because it was state-owned (and thus covered by the New York Taylor Law, which prohibited strikes, rather than the Railway Labor Act). The union of the railroad's workers sued in federal District court and commenced a strike the next day. The President of the U.S. intervened and ordered a 60-day cooling off period during which “the State converted the Railroad from a private stock corporation to a public benefit corporation” to try to run around the Railway Labor Act. The railroad then filed a state suit, “seeking to enjoin the impending strike under the Taylor Law,” but then the District Court decided the Railway Labor Act did apply to the Long Island Rail Road (1). However, the Court of Appeals reversed this ruling.

According to the District Court, the precedent set in National League of Cities v. Usery outlined that the “operation of a railroad in interstate commerce is not an integral part of governmental activity” (2). The Supreme Court noted that the Railroad really was held “to the terms of the Railway Labor Act,” but since it was a state railroad, the issue was whether the terms of that Act hindered the State from carrying out its functions (3).

Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that cases involving the doctrine in National League of Cities have three tests, and the one that this United Transportation Union is concerned with is “whether... the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions'” (4). In short, the Court decided that a railroad dealing with interstate commerce was “not an integral part of traditional state activities” safe from federal regulation (5). Chief Justice Warren went on to explain that, besides, railroads had been under federal regulation for over 100 years before, and New York knew the Long Island Rail Road was under regulation for 13 years before doing anything about it. The Supreme Court thus reversed the ruling of the Appeals court and decided the railroad was to be held under the Railway Labor Act.

In my opinion, the decision in this case was in line with other cases decided by the Court, such that the Federal government reserved the right to regulate Interstate trade. This is based on the Commerce Clause found in the Constitution, as discussed in class (U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8). Thus, because this right is given to Congress in the Constitution, the State laws concerning the same matter are not necessarily protected by the Tenth Amendment. It is clear that New York was putting up a fuss about the federal rights regarding this railroad solely to use state laws to its advantage in trying to stop the strike from happening.

However, what surprised me the most about this case was not the case itself but what happened before the case. Specifically, that the President had the right to intervene and order a longer cooling-off period in order to avoid a strike, although in the end it did not really work. I feel like that was overstepping the powers given to him, otherwise I do not know the whole story or have just overlooked a Constitutional power given to the President.

Bibliography:

1.“United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co.,” Supreme Court case syllabus and opinion by Chief Justice Burger, hosted by Cornell University Law School. Website not dated, accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/455/678

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.